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When convoy HX 84 assembled at Halifax, Nova Scotia during late October 1940, it comprised 30 merchant ships escorted by the Royal Canadian Navy Town class destroyers HMCS Columbia (ex USS Haraden) and St Francis (ex USS Bancroft) and his majesty’s armed merchant cruiser HMS Jervis Bay.
Apart from the three warships, each merchant ship was equipped with a 4-inch (101.6 mm) gun mounted on its stern primarily for defence against surfaced U-boats. However, many of these weapons were decades old and all but worn out. With luck, a ship’s gunner might be an ex-Royal Navy sailor brought out of retirement, otherwise it was a DEMS (defensively equipped merchant ship) trained merchant seafarer who’d attended a three-day course. Additionally, the merchant ships carried smoke floats. A smoke float looked somewhat akin an oil drum and was activated by seawater, a chemical reaction taking place causing its contents to ignite thereby creating a smokescreen.
This was the 84th North Atlantic convoy of the war. The speed of the convoy was set at a maximum of 9 knots (10.35mph, 16.66kmh), though even this would be pushing several freighters such as the Gydnia American Lines Morska Wola to their limits. The oldest ship present was the Norwegian flagged Varoy of 1531 gross registered tons (grt), a veteran of the seas dating from 1892 and loaded with newsprint. Second oldest was the 4603grt Greek freighter Anna Bulgaris completed in 1912, carrying a mixed cargo of newsprint and steel. The newest was the 5117grt freighter Dan-Y-Bryn, only recently completed by Burntisland Shipbuilding for the Brynymor Steamship Co, and now loaded with maize.
The convoy’s official destination was Liverpool, England, though many ships were bound for other ports including Belfast, Hull, Great Yarmouth, Avonmouth, Glasgow, Oban, and London. The Morska Wola carrying general cargo and the Clyde-built Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co motor tanker Delphinula were both bound for Manchester; the motor vessel Stureholm owned by the Svenska Amerika Mexico Line and loaded with steel and scrap iron, was one of several ships whose destination was Oban
HX 84 sailed on 28 October. After steaming 350 miles HMCS Columbia and HMCS St Francis turned back to base, leaving the convoy in the sole care of the Jervis Bay. For the next 1500 miles or so the convoy’s only real threat might be from a surface ship as at this stage of the war German U-boats were forbidden to patrol beyond 20 degrees latitude west.
Meanwhile convoy BHX 84 (Bermuda – Halifax) comprising six tankers, two freighters and the armed merchant cruiser HMS Ranpura was en-route, having left Bermuda on 26 October. The custom was for UK-bound ships from BHX convoys to join HX convoys at sea rather than enter Halifax. The two convoys merged on 31 October, though the Ranpura detached and steamed west. The earliest Jervis Bay could expect reinforcements from UK-based warships of Western Approaches Command was some time on Wednesday, 6 November.
With the addition of the BHX vessels, the convoy comprising 38 merchant ships was organised into nine columns 600 yards (548.6 metres) apart from one another with the ships in each column trundling along 400 yards (365.7 metres) stern to bow apart. Jervis Bay took up station in the middle of the convoy between and astern of the Stureholm (column 4) and Vingaland (column 5), and ahead and between the Briarwood (column 4) and Athelempress (column 5).
However, during 2 November the Morska Wola, unable to maintain 9 knots became detached from the convoy. The same day the Eagle Oil Co motor tanker, MV San Demetrio, loaded with about 12,000 tons of aviation fuel and therefore considered nothing more than a floating bomb, developed engine trouble. She too was left behind though thanks to the skill of her engineers and a speed more than 12 knots, she rejoined HX 84 on the evening of the 4th. The convoy was down to 37 merchantmen and might soon drop to 36 as the Ellerman & Papayanni Line 3067grt SS Castilian was struggling to maintain 9 knots.
The Convoy Commodore, Rear-Admiral H B Maltby RN, flew his flag on the Sir William Reardon Smith & Sons 4952grt SS Cornish City positioned at the head of the centre column. As Commodore, Maltby, who’d been brought out of retirement, oversaw the merchant ships – badgering them to keep station, to keep smoke to a minimum, to report engine defects and so on. He was not in command of Jervis Bay.
Built for the Australian Commonwealth Line, Jervis Bay was one of five almost identical liners introduced during the early 1920s to cater for the growing Australian emigrant service. At around 14164grt apiece, the five sisters maintained a monthly scheduled service between London, Fremantle, Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane.
In those days Jervis Bay could accommodate twelve first class passengers (usually Government officials) though the migrants’ (up to 700 per voyage) accommodation was a somewhat Spartan third class.
A 93.64% turnout for the 1928 Australian federal election gave Nationalist/Country Coalition leader Stanley Bruce his fifth consecutive election victory.
Bruce’s administration sold the Commonwealth Line to the White Star Line. It was then merged with the White Star subsidiary Aberdeen Line to form the Aberdeen & Commonwealth Line.
During 1931 Jervis Bay underwent a major refit, reducing her passenger accommodation to 270 Tourist Class and creating hold space for general cargo.
As the political situation in Europe deteriorated throughout 1938, the Ministry of Transport was instructed that large liners and cargo liners undergo survey to assess their suitability for conversion into armed merchant cruisers or depot or repair ships should the need arise.
Jervis Bay and her four sisterships were duly identified as suitable armed merchant cruiser candidates and on 24 August 1939, Commonwealth Lines (as the company was now called), were informed by telegram that with immediate effect their Bay class ships were to be requisitioned for Government service.
As the only Commonwealth Lines vessel then in UK waters, Jervis Bay was quickly taken in hand by shipbuilders Harland & Wolff. As she lacked the armour plate, compartmentalisation, and watertight subdivision of a regular warship, Harland & Wolff improvised, loading her with 24,000 empty 45-gallon (245.6 litre) barrels to aid buoyancy should the hull be breached during action.
Jervis Bay’s main battery comprised seven antiquated Mk VII 6-inch (152 mm) guns in single mounts, the gunners’ protection being open-backed splinter shields. The guns were positioned so that two could fire directly forwards, three fire directly astern, and four fire on either broadside. The official maximum range of the Mk VIIs was 15,800 yards (14,400 metres). The heaviest shell back in the 1890s would have been Lyddite weighing in at 13 pounds 5 ounces (6 kg). However, the gun barrels were so worn that accurate fire beyond 10,000 yards (9144 metres) would have been nigh on impossible.
Her anti-aircraft defence consisted of a pair of even older 3-inch (76.2 mm) quick firers. Her fire control systems were almost as outdated as her guns, as she lacked modern director-controlled rangefinders, and she was not equipped with radar.
Having been brought out of retirement, Captain Arthur Harris RN, was appointed her commanding officer on 2 September.
Though Jervis Bay might hold her own against an enemy armed merchant cruiser or a surfaced U-boat, she lacked any meaningful anti-aircraft defences and limited anti-submarine capability. If push came to shove, the 3-inch AA guns could add to the broadsides.
Having been repainted battleship grey Jervis Bay was commissioned at the Royal Albert Docks, London. Her ship’s company of 255 officers and men included 35 officers and 97 petty officers and ratings from her original crew. The officers were commissioned, and each given an equivalent Royal Navy Reserve (RNR) rank. Having signed T124 agreements, the petty officers and men retained their ranks and pay rates though were now classed as Naval Auxiliary Personnel, wearing RN uniforms and subject to naval discipline. Their service under T124 articles was for a period of twelve months.
At the time of Jervis Bay’s commissioning, there were twelve other liners in the Royal Albert Docks undergoing conversion. Of these, the fate of the Rawalpindi would be intertwined with that of Jervis Bay.
Based at Scapa Flow, the Northern Patrol was a force comprising twenty armed merchant cruisers. As well as Jervis Bay and the Rawalpindi, there were ships representing Cunard, Royal Mail Lines, Bibby Line, Canadian Pacific, White Star Line, Alfred Holt, and Anchor Line.
Jervis Bay’s operational record whilst stationed at Scapa Flow was as accident prone as the early exploits of the fictional lend-lease destroyer HMS Ballantrae in the 1952 movie The Gift Horse.
Her first incident resulted in a badly damaged steam winch after an anchor fouled a cable. The damage was severe enough for the ship to be sent to Hebburn-on-Tyne for repairs.
It is thought it was during these repairs that Jervis Bay’s patrol schedule was reallocated to HMS Rawalpindi.
On 16 October, Jervis Bay was involved in a further incident when she rammed and extensively damaged the veteran destroyer HMS Sabre at Rosyth. Jervis Bay was sent the Tyne for yet more repairs, and it was there her crew heard of the sinking of the Rawalpindi. Equipped with half a dozen old Mk VII 6-inch guns Rawalpindi had single-handedly engaged the German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Rawalpindi’s loss led to a rethink by the Admiralty, and subsequently all armed merchant cruisers were ordered repainted in their former house colours as and when time permitted. For Jervis Bay this meant a return to green hull, white superstructure and buff funnels, masts and ventilators.
By Christmas 1939, Jervis Bay was at anchor in the Solent loaded with ammunition for Freetown, Sierra Leone.
From January 1940, Jervis Bay escorted convoys SL017F and SL023F though she didn’t come all the way back to England with them. About 19 February, she undertook what was the longest ever tow recorded during the Second World War. She relieved the armed merchant cruiser HMS Queen of Bermuda in the South Atlantic to tow the crippled J & C Harrison freighter SS Hartismere to Freetown.
On 28 February 1940, Commander Edward Stephen Fogarty Fegan, who hailed from Ballinunty, County Tipperary, was appointed Acting Captain of the Jervis Bay, relieving Commander James Blackburn at Freetown on 1 April. Blackburn had been in temporary command following the sudden illness of Captain Harris. Fegen’s orders were to take the ship to Hamilton, Bermuda, where it would be based as a convoy escort.
After successfully escorting several BHX convoys, Jervis Bay redeployed to Halifax during September 1940 to undertake HX convoy duties as an ocean escort, in other words keeping a convoy company all the way across the North Atlantic.
The morning of 5 November was overcast with a calm sea running. At around 1000hrs a ship was spotted closing HX84 at speed from astern. Challenged by Jervis Bay, the stranger was identified by her recognition flags GXSD flying from her yardarm. She was the independently routed Elders & Fyffes cargo liner Mopan, bound for Garston, Liverpool from Port Antonio, Jamaica, with 70,000 stems of bananas. By noon the banana boat was disappearing over the horizon and given her speed, with luck, she could well make the Mersey late on the 7th.
At 5389grt, the Cammell Laird-built Mopan could make 15 knots, fast enough to keep her out of trouble. Indeed, the Mopan’s skipper S. S. Sapsworth turned down an offer to join the convoy.
However, at 52. 48 N, 32.15 W, Mopan’s luck ran out when at 1430 hrs a lookout reported a single mast on the horizon to the north. It turned out to be the Deutschland class panzerschiff (armoured ship) Admiral Scheer, a sistership of the Admiral Graf Spee scuttled in the aftermath of the Battle of the River Plate.
The Deutschland class were better known in the UK as pocket battleships on account of their main armament of six 11-inch (28 cm) guns mounted in triple turrets and secondary battery of eight 5.9-inch (15 cm) guns mounted in single turrets, four each side.
Under Article 190 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had been forbidden to build armoured (panzerschiff) warships displacing more than 10,160 tons. Though they owned up that Admiral Scheer had exceeded the Treaty limit by 100 tons or so, they didn’t own up to the fact that she had exceeded it by more than 3400 tons.
Commissioned in November 1934, Admiral Scheer displaced about 1000 tons more than the Royal Navy’s County class heavy cruisers. However, though the County class were faster; 31.5 knots compared to Scheer’s 28.3 knots, they were totally outgunned. The County class 8-inch (203 mm) Mk VIII guns could fire 256 pound (116 kg) high explosive shells to a maximum range of 29,000 yards (26,520 metres); Admiral Scheer’s 11-inch main battery could fire 727.5 pound (330 kg) high velocity armour piercing shells to a maximum range of 44,760 yards (40,930 metres).
The Deutschlands were designed from the outset as fast commerce raiders, using their speed to keep out of the way of battleships and battlecruisers, and their firepower to overwhelm a typical convoy escort of destroyers and cruisers. During the early months of 1940 the Scheer underwent a major refit receiving a clipper bow, significant modifications to her superstructure, especially her command tower, and the installation of a new radar set. The Kriegsmarine subsequently reclassified her as a heavy cruiser.
During October 1940, the Scheer deployed on her first combat sortie of the war. Using a weather front, she passed unobserved through the Denmark Strait between Greenland and Iceland on 31 October. Her commanding officer Kapitan zur See Theodor Krancke broke radio silence to advise that his ship had entered the North Atlantic. German Naval Intelligence (B-Dienst) responded with orders to intercept and destroy HX 84. Given that weather conditions were rapidly improving, Krancke expected to intercept on or about 5 November.
Krancke ordered that a wide berth the given to all other surface radar contacts. In fact, many of her crew were unaware she was fitted with such equipment. Following the remodelling of her command tower, Scheer was equipped with the latest radar, the FuMO27 (Funkness Ortung direction finder, active ranging) array. It included four Sumatra antennas spaced 90 degrees apart, three of which were mounted on lattice extensions. An antenna was also mounted on the aft rangefinder tower. This radar had at least four times more power than earlier models, its range was determined by the height at which it was mounted. German battlecruisers fitted with the same set found it reliable to distances of 25-30,000 metres.
At 0940 hrs on the morning of 5 November, the raider launched her Arado 196 spotter plane. Its aircrew were ordered to observe radio silence. When it was recovered at 1205 hrs its observer reported sighting an east-bound convoy at 52. 41 N, 32. 52 W, about 100 miles (170 km) away. The fact that Jervis Bay was no longer wearing battleship grey led the observer to report that no escort vessels were present.
Krancke brought Scheer up to 23 knots, expecting to intercept HX 84 with sufficient daylight remaining in which to wreak havoc. He could have held back and attacked the following day. To do so however, risked a possible clash with escort vessels from the UK.
However, Krancke’s plan hit an unexpected snag when Scheer stumbled across the Mopan steaming east along the intercept course. Krancke had no alternative but to engage and ordered the hoisting of flags WZ the international signal for YOU SHOULD STOP YOUR VESSEL INSTANTLY. Simultaneously, Mopan was signalled by lamp not to use her wireless or face immediate destruction.
As Mopan appeared somewhat stubborn in heaving too, Krancke ordered his 5.9-inch guns to put shots across Mopan’s bow – again an internationally recognised practice to order a ship to stop. At least one shot fell close enough to Mopan for shrapnel to wreck the port side forward lifeboat. Mopan obeyed and heaved too and Sapsworth followed Krancke’s instruction to abandon ship and row over to the Scheer to surrender.
James Macintosh, Mopan’s radio officer, continually pleaded with Captain Sapsworth to be allowed to transmit R-R-R (I am under attack by a raider) as it would warn HX 84 there was something big and brutal over the horizon. Sapsworth refused.
The abandonment was however carried out at a sedate pace, crew members packing essentials, some even changing into their going ashore clothes. Afterall they were going to be prisoners of war. In the meantime, Scheer had manoeuvred to within a few hundred meters of the cargo liner. Once Sapsworth and his crew had cleared their ship, Krancke, who by now was probably getting impatient as there was a little over one hour of decent daylight left, ordered his secondary battery to open fire.
Alas for Krancke, Mopan proved obstinate to gunfire and though on fire and listing refused to do the decent thing and sink. Valuable time was lost, and the sun was well down before she was finally finished off.
At 1545 hrs lookouts on the Rangitiki, the biggest ship in the convoy, spotted smoke on the horizon bearing 020 degrees. The 16-knot 16,697grt twin-screw motorship Rangitiki was owned by the New Zealand Shipping Co. She was loaded with timber, a refrigerated cargo of butter, meat and cheese. She was also carrying passengers, many of whom had volunteered to act as lookouts, scanning the sea for U-boats. Unbeknown to the lookouts the smoke was from the burning wreck of the Mopan.
However, at around 1605 hrs Jervis Bay was signalled by the Joseph Constantine Steamship Line 4013grt freighter SS Briarwood that smoke had been sighted on the horizon at 005 degrees.
Fegen altered course and speed, bringing Jervis Bay to the head of the convoy abeam of the Rangitiki. The raider was still about fifteen miles away when Jervis Bay’s chief yeoman signalled the recognition call sign AA. at intervals on his Aldis lamp.
Krancke was keen to get as close as possible as Scheer’s radar plot was positively alive with contacts. Krancke, who was observing from the raider’s foretop, instantly recognised that the size of the flashes from the Aldis lamp indicated the signal was coming from a warship. Apparently warship signal lamps were of a larger diameter than those of merchant vessels. A brawl with an escort vessel was the last thing Krancke needed.
Krancke said to his signals officer “She’ll give her recognition signal in a moment. Repeat it at once as if we’re calling her.” After some minutes Jervis Bay flashed that day’s recognition signal M-A-G three times. A British warship would have signalled the correct response. Krancke’s bluff of repeating M-A-G didn’t fool Fegen.
The raider was about ten miles away when at 1700 hrs she turned broadside. Any doubts Fegen might have had as to the identity of the ship dissipated as there, large as life, was a Deutschland class pocket battleship. Those ships were of such a distinct design that Fegen wouldn’t have needed to look her up in Jane’s Fighting Ships.
At 1706 hrs Jervis Bay transmitted her last coded signal to the Admiralty.
To: Any British Man of War. I BC 328-12-208 YZUR 1540. One battleship bearing 328, distance 12 miles, course 208 from position indicated.
Their Lordships’ response was to order the battlecruisers Hood and Repulse, three cruisers and six destroyers to steam at best speed for Jervis Bay’s last reported position.
Also at 1706 hrs, Fegen signalled Maltby to hoist the signal to scatter. Simultaneously, Fegen ordered the firing of red rockets – a pre-arranged signal to scatter. Jervis Bay began dropping smoke floats as the merchant ships scattered predominantly to the southeast.
As the raider could now train both 11-inch turrets Jervis Bay, Krancke ordered his secondary battery gun directors to range in on a nearby tanker.
According to Krancke’s own memoir one of Scheer’s main battery turrets fired a ranging salvo which landed within 200 metres of Jervis Bay.
A second ranging salvo fired by both turrets fell close enough for shrapnel to cause light damage and decapitate a member of Jervis Bay’s forward port 6-inch gun crew. Unfazed, Fegen altered course steering straight for the Scheer. Jervis Bay returned fire even though the raider was well out of range.
There was no escaping the next hail of 11-inch shells. They ripped into the armed merchant cruiser amidships, trashing the parts of the superstructure, wrecking the radio cabin, blowing away the foremast. Her guns were rendered almost useless as the electric power supply had been severed and the fire control system destroyed.
Still eager to close the range, Fegen ordered full speed ahead. An 11-inch shell crashed through the bridge and in doing so almost completely severed one of his arms. Given the confusion of battle, eyewitness accounts of Fegen’s subsequent movements differ. With the bridge wrecked, and despite his wounds, Fegen made his way aft to the auxiliary steering position (aft docking bridge) and controlled the ship from there. When that too was wrecked by gunfire, he staggered back to the bridge. He was never seen again.
However, things were not necessarily going the raider’s way. A temporary electrical failure resulted in the 4th and 5th 11-inch salvos going wide of their target. Also, though Scheer’s radar was accurate, it was delicate, and the force exerted by the recoil from her 11-inch guns damaged the delicate crystal in the radar thereby rendering it useless. Furthermore, the Arado floatplane mounted on the ship’s catapult was rendered unflyable, damaged by the blast waves when the 11-inch turrets fired. Though engineers said they could repair the Arado, for the time being the raider had effectively blinded itself.
Survivors reported that the raider continued to fire on Jervis Bay even after she no longer posed a threat. It appears that after her guns had been silenced, an explosion of cordite bags on the aft gun platform was interpreted as the gun being brought back into action. Scheer responded with an accurate 6th, devastating broadside from her main battery. The shells tore into the already burning wreck, blowing part of her main engine clear out of her.
Twenty-two minutes after the action had commenced, the order was given to abandon ship. With all but one of the lifeboats destroyed, survivors were forced to take to the emergency life rafts and hatch covers. By 1730 hrs Jervis Bay was on her way to the bottom of the North Atlantic.
Apart from the incident with the cordite, it is permissible under the rules of war for warships to continue firing upon one another unless one strikes her colours.
If no order was issued to strike any colours still flying, then under the terms of the Geneva Convention which at the time both sides were adhering too, Krancke was within his rights to continue firing. The Royal Navy continued to shell and then torpedo the German battleship Bismarck long after she had ceased firing. Bismarck did not strike her colours.
And what of other ships in the convoy?
With Jervis Bay no longer a threat, Krancke ordered his secondary battery to open fire on the motor tanker Delphinula. Her wily skipper dropped a smoke float which drifted astern and then ordered the activation of four more positioned on her poop. The thick black smoke and flames created proved enough for the Scheer’s gunnery officer to be convinced that the tanker was a goner. It wasn’t and the Delphinula survived to make it to Manchester Docks.
Though the Rangitiki was close by, Captain Barnett decided not to open fire with his 4-inch as the flash would give his position away and might ultimately lead to the loss of the biggest ship in HX 84. If fact Rangitiki was at one point straddled by salvos from the raider but escaped.
By now, with light all but gone and merchant ships dropping smoke floats to cover their tracks as they scattered, the raider probed the ever-increasing darkness with her powerful searchlight. A new target quickly presented itself in the form of the Brocklebank Line freighter Maidan. Prior to the order to scatter, she had been positioned in column eight, 400 yards astern of the tanker San Demetrio. The raider’s gunfire proved accurate and Maidan, carrying general cargo as well as military vehicles and ammunition, suddenly blew up, taking all 91 members of her crew with her to the bottom.
Next in line for a taste of Scheer’s gunfire was San Demetrio though that was through shear bad luck. The raider’s searchlight had initially illuminated the Castillian, but she had just steamed past the big fat tanker and that offered value for shell fire. As the Castillian slipped away San Demetrio took several direct hits and was set on fire. Captain George Waite gave the order to abandon ship. Taking to three lifeboats, the crew attempted to stay together though during the night the lifeboats became separated. The survivors in two of the boats were rescued. The fate of the crew in the third lifeboat became the stuff of legend and their exploits made it to the cinema in the 1943 movie San Demetrio London.
Having drifted for 24 hours, the lifeboat skippered by Second Officer Arthur Hawkins came across a burning ship. It was San Demetrio. After waiting some hours, they re-boarded her and set about bringing fires under control. Chief Engineer Charles Pollard and Third Engineer George Willey managed to restore power to the pumps and auxiliaries and enabling the ship to get underway. With all charts destroyed and no compass, Hawkins commanded San Demetrio from the emergency steering position aft, relying on a sixpenny atlas as a guide.
Seven days later, off the west coast of Ireland the tanker was given an escort to the Clyde where she docked on 16 November. As they had not received assistance in bringing San Demetrio into port, the re-boarders were entitled to salvage money.
Second Officer Hawkins and Chief Engineer Pollard were awarded £2000 (around £84,600 in 2024) each. Third Engineer George Willey received £1400, and Deck Apprentice John Jones and Boatswain W E Fletcher £1200 each. Other re-boarders received varying amounts ranging from £1000 to £100.
Hawkins was also awarded an OBE, Chief Officer Pollard and Deck Apprentice Jones were both awarded the Lloyd’s War Medal for Bravery at Sea. John Boyle, a greaser, had been injured jumping into the lifeboat when abandoning ship. After reboarding and despite his internal injuries, he maintained watch keeping duties in the engine room until collapsing and subsequently dying of a haemorrhage. As well as his estate being awarded £1000 salvage money, he posthumously received the King’s Commendation for Brave Conduct.
And San Demetrio? Following repairs the tanker returned to service. On 17 March 1942, whilst sailing alone northwest of Cape Charles, Virginia, she was torpedoed and sunk by U-404.
Scheer then turned her attention to the 5201grt Hain Steamship Co freighter Trewellard loaded with 7800 tons of steel plate and carrying a deck cargo of twelve aircraft. There was enough time for all but sixteen of her crew to escape in lifeboats.
Scheer’s next victim was the Ulster Steamship Co 5225grt Kenbane Head bound for her home port of Belfast loaded with steel plate, maize, and military vehicles. It was also a case of mistaken identity. From out of the chaos a 4-inch shell dropped close enough to the Scheer to splash her with spray. Scheer’s 24-inch (609.6 mm) searchlight suddenly caught the freighter in its beam. It was a twist of fate.
The first salvo ripped into the freighter’s holds. The second, straddled her, hitting the engine room, tearing off her funnel and destroying the gun platform on her stern. Soon ablaze, her crew had little alternative other than to abandon ship. However, the shelling had destroyed the ship’s lifeboats and surviving crew members had to take to the sole surviving serviceable life raft and two jolly boats. Shortly after she’d been abandoned the ship blew up.
Interestingly, at 0300 hrs on the 6th, the survivors were astonished to see the burning, drifting San Demetrio wallowing its way toward them. Not shying away from a chance to board her, and thereby escape deteriorating sea conditions, Captain Tom Milner ordered Second Officer George Leckey to take his 16 ft long jolly boat around the stern of the tanker to see if it might be possible to board her. Leckey and the nine men with him were never seen again and it is assumed their jolly boat was smashed against the tanker’s hull. Eight more of the Kenbane Head’s crew perished that night, and with daybreak all survivors were congregated aboard to remaining jolly boat.
If Krancke thought his next victim would be a pushover, he was in for a surprise.
On receiving the order to scatter, Captain Hugh Pettigrew turned his ship, the 10,042grt Canadian Pacific Railways cargo liner SS Beaverford away from the Scheer. Completed in 1928, the Beaverford was carrying refined aluminium, copper, maize, meat and cheese, though her No.1 hold was packed with ammunition. She was also carrying a deck cargo of timber and crated aircraft.
When built, Beaverford and her sisterships were state of the art cargo liners. Though coal-fired, they were the first ships in the Merchant Navy to be fitted with Erith-Roe mechanical stokers. Their geared steam turbines and twin screws placed them amongst the fastest (14 knots) and most manoeuvrable ships of their type flying the red ensign.
Beaverford was requisitioned by the Admiralty during February 1940, for the transportation of vital cargo. Unusually for a merchant ship at this stage of the war she was equipped with two guns. A 3-inch (76.2 mm) mounted forward, and a 4-inch mounted aft. Two crewmembers were trained DEMS gunners. Under the Geneva Convention, merchant ships were permitted to mount a gun on their sterns as a legitimate defence against an enemy giving chase. Theoretically, Beaverford’s forward 3-inch mount enabled her to launch an attack. In other words, should the need have arisen, the Germans might have argued that Beaverford was in fact an auxiliary warship. It was a 4-inch shell from Beaverford that Kenbane Head had paid the price for.
As the one-sided battle between Scheer and Jervis Bay had played out, Beaverford’s radio operator had transmitted continuous updates on the action. When Captain Pettigrew saw the Kenbane Head, suddenly blow up, he turned his ship about and steamed straight for the Scheer.
Beaverford’s radio officer John Fraser transmitted one last message. “It is our turn now. So long. The captain and crew of the SS Beaverford.”
A veteran of HX 1 in September 1939, this was Beaverford’s sixteenth Atlantic convoy. Under Pettigrew’s consummate seamanship, the cargo liner would hold up the Scheer for more than four hours giving the other ships of HX 84 the chance to put some distance between themselves and the raider.
Surprised to see a merchant ship steaming straight for him, Krancke ordered one of his forward 4.1-inch AA turrets to fire several star shells in quick succession. They lit Beaverford up.
Beaverford generated her own smokescreen, using it to hide other ships, and using it herself to dash in and out of to harass the raider. Even more impressive is that her steam turbines and twin screws enabled Pettigrew to alter speed and course between the flashes from Scheer’s guns and the shells arriving. The cargo liner initiated an ultimately deadly dance with the raider, Pettigrew steering a haphazard zigzag course, Beaverford emerging from the smokescreen long enough to fire a broadside then turning away her turbines screaming and no doubt Chief Engineer John Sinclair cursing as she retreated into the smoke.
The action continued into the dead of night; the raider forced to fire more star shells in the hope of illuminating what was proving to be an elusive adversary. However, the raider began to score hits, and the ensuing fires aboard the cargo liner made it difficult to hide.
The nearest ship was the Fresno City, and her crew observed the star shells and shelling. The ship’s log recorded that ‘Beaverford, bearing 110 degrees East South East, was attacked and set on fire, distance about 10 miles.’
The raider expended twelve rounds of 11-inch and 71 rounds of 5.9-inch ammunition against the Beaverford. Of these three 11-inch and sixteen 5.9-inch were direct hits. With her turbines damaged Beaverford slowed to a stand. Even so, her deck cargo of timber was keeping her afloat.
Scheer closed the range and at 2245 hrs launched a torpedo. It tore into number one hold where ammunition was stowed. The ship blew up producing a massive fireball. As there was no allied ship in the vicinity, any survivors out of her crew of 77 were lost to the sea. The youngest aboard was 16-year-old Eric Crowhurst. Eric was employed as the Steward’s Boy. It was his first and last trip. The oldest crew member to perish was Tom Anderson aged 61. A fireman, Tom had been at sea since leaving school.
In the pitch-black night Scheer found only one more ship from HX 84. Completed during 1929 for Reardon Smith & Co, the 4995grt freighter Fresno City loaded with maize had turned southeast upon the order to scatter. The raider steamed east before turning south through southwest in effect looping around the fleeing merchant ships. Stumbling across the Fresno City was just that as Krancke had already set a course to rendezvous with a supply ship. Illuminated by the raider’s searchlight, Fresno City quickly succumbed to gunfire and all but one of the crew survived to abandoned ship.
The raider’s tally for HX 84 was an armed merchant cruiser and five other ships sunk. Surprisingly, given the chaos reigning as ships scattered, not one was lost or damaged by collision though there were several near misses.
However, it was only just the beginning for the Scheer. Her cruise would last 161 days and take her as far as the Indian Ocean before returning to her home base at Keil on 1 April 1941. She would be by far the most successful of the Kriegsmarine’s capital ship commerce raiders, accounting for 113,223grts of allied shipping.
Following the order to scatter, Sven Olander skipper of the MV Stureholm followed the Swedish custom of calling his crew together and asking if they were prepared to turn back and search for survivors. It was an almost unanimous vote so to do. Several hours after Jervis Bay had sunk, under the cover of darkness, and whilst the raider was occupied elsewhere, Olander and his crew began their search. By daybreak they had rescued 65 survivors from the armed merchant cruiser. The Stureholm returned to Halifax arriving on 12 November.
Another ship to answer distress calls was the Bristol City Lines, SS Gloucester City. She was south of the Denmark Strait when she picked up a SOS from the Rangitiki which at the time was being shelled. Captain Sydney Smith estimated that the earliest he could get Gloucester City to Rangitiki’s position was early on the 7th. It would still be dark and given the barometer was falling a heavy sea was likely.
As Gloucester City approached the search area Captain Smith ordered extra lookouts posted. At around 0700 hrs, one of San Demetrio’s lifeboats was spotted. It contained the Chief Officer and eighteen others. Ninety minutes later, the second San Demetrio lifeboat was rescued. It contained four survivors including Captain Waite. At noon the two lifeboats containing survivors from the Trewellard were picked up. Finally, at around 1400 hrs, two more lifeboats were spotted. One was from the Kenbane Head, the other from the Fresno City. After criss-crossing a debris field covering an estimated 50 square miles (129.5 sq km), the search was reluctantly called off at nightfall. In any case increasingly heavy seas made further rescue impossible. With 92 survivors on board, Captain Smith turned his ship for St John’s Newfoundland, arriving there on the 13th. Captain Smith was later awarded an OBE for his ‘outstanding courage and leadership during the war’.
On 8 November, the Swedish Vingaland a former member of HX 84 was off the West coast of County Donegal when she was attacked, bombed and set ablaze by a Focke-Wulf Kondor Fw200 maritime aircraft. The following day she was finished off with a torpedo fired from the Italian submarine Guglielmo Marconi. Survivors from the Vingaland were rescued by the Danae II also a former member of HX 84.
The first flotilla of the American lend-lease destroyers bound for the UK; HMS Churchill (ex USS Herndon), HMS Lincoln (ex USS Yarnall), HMS Ludlow (ex USS Stockton) and HMS Lewes (ex USS Craven), had departed Halifax on 31 October putting in at St John’s Newfoundland on 3 November to refuel prior to their run across the Atlantic. On receiving distress calls from HX 84, the flotilla steamed for the area, carrying out a search. All they found was an empty lifeboat whilst at the same time failing to spot either the Stureholm or the Gloucester City both of which were still in the search area. The flotilla then resumed its course arriving at Londonderry on 9 November.
On Wednesday 13 November, despite little detail in official briefings, British newspapers were publishing stories surrounding HX 84. By then at least 24 merchant ships from the convoy had arrived in port. The Liverpool Evening Echo named eight of the ships, including five registered in the city. Ellerman & Papayanni Line 3082grt Andalusian, United Molasses 8939grt Atheltempler and 8941grt Athelempress (both tankers), Lancashire Shipping Co 5172grt Lancaster Castle, and the Oil Tank Steam Ship Co (C T Bowring & Co) 8190grt tanker Cordelia. Ironically, all five eventually became casualties of the war. The Andalusian, loaded with 3231 tons of cocoa beans, was torpedoed and sunk by U-106 approximately 100 miles east of Cape Verde on 17 March 1941.The motor tanker Atheltempler was torpedoed off the North Cape by U-408 on 14 September 1942, and sistership Athelempress was torpedoed and then sunk by gunfire by U-162 in the North Atlantic on 29 April 1942. The Lancaster Castle was bombed and sunk in Murmansk Roads on 14 April 1942, and the Cordelia was torpedoed and sunk 500 miles south of Iceland by U-632 on 3 February 1943.
When the Rangitiki arrived safely back in the UK, all the female passengers lined up to kiss the ship’s captain before they disembarked.
The Exeter-based Express & Echo leader for 13 November began, ‘The story of the Jervis Bay full details of which are yet to come, is one to stir the blood of Britishers, and indeed of all seafaring people, and to make them proud. In history it will rank with the deathless story of the Rawalpindi, and other tales of recorded heroism that have become legendary.’
It was also on Wednesday 13 November, that Winston Churchill informed the House of Commons of the devasting attack by the Fleet Air Arm on the Italian fleet at Taranto. He concluded with “The spirit of the Royal Navy shown in this daring attack is also exemplified in the forlorn, heroic action fought by the captain, officers and ship’s company of HMS Jervis Bay in the Atlantic in giving battle against overwhelming odds to protect a merchant convoy which it was escorting and securing the escape of by far the greater part of that convoy.”
The London Daily News interviewed several skippers from ships that had made it to port. One said, “Her shooting [Admiral Scheer] was accurate and regular, often five shells being fired in one group. The raider was about eight miles off and I estimated that the salvoes were from 11-inch guns.”
Another captain thought the raider was a 6000-ton Nuremburg class light cruiser. “The Jervis Bay fought like the Rawalpindi, caring nothing for herself.”
Five days later the Liverpool Journal & Commerce was one of many publications both at home and abroad reporting that Commander (Acting Captain) Edward Stephen Fogarty Fegen had rightly been awarded the Victoria Cross, for challenging hopeless odds and giving his life to save as many of the ships it was his duty to protect. There were awards for other members of the ship’s complement.
The following day, an Admiralty communique stated that all but eight ships of the convoy had been accounted for. Also added was, “Due to the rapid deterioration of weather conditions, it must be considered unlikely that there are other survivors.”
On 23 November, the Tamworth Herald published a poem by Evelyn E Fish entitled Farewell HMS Jervis Bay.
No more, with eager throngs aboard you sail,
From misty Southampton to the Southern Seas,
No more through Suez and the hot Red Sea,
Your proud flag fluttering in the sea breeze;
No more Ceylon greet you with odours sweet
When outward bound for the Land of the Southern Cross,
We can but honour and remember you,
With proud and thankful hearts we mourn your loss.
Honour to you and your brave captain,
Who steered you forth to meet the bullying foe,
For others you bought, for them you gave all;
Nelson himself will honour you, for he must know
The story of your gallant, heroic fight,
No inglorious dump shall be your grave,
But the mighty depths of the inconquerable deep;
Until the Awakening, peacefully sleep the brave.
Farewell from Melbourne, Sydney and Freemantle
Farewell from Adelaide and far Brisbane
Farewell from all who sail the world
With you, to lands you will not see again.
Farewell, good ship, Farewell brave hearts, Farewell!
To you Mother Country make a vow –
She will for ever rule the oceans wide,
Always, as surely as she rules it now.
Many more poems were published on both sides of the Atlantic including the Ballard of the Jervis Bay by J W Mullholland, which featured in the Wednesday 4 December edition of the Nelson Daily News, British Columbia.
It wasn’t until 28 February 1941, that an official Admiralty communique listed the casualties for Jervis Bay. According to the Hull Daily Mail, Acting Captain E S F Fegen, VC, and 27 other officers were listed as missing presumed killed. Five other officers were listed as killed and another who had died from his wounds. Of the remainder, 35 ratings were listed killed and 99 missing presumed killed. Nine ratings were listed as dying from wounds, and a further six ratings were recovering from wounds. Thirteen Royal Canadian Navy personnel were missing presumed killed, and two others were still receiving treatment for their wounds.
However, the Beaverford’s alleged action that day has been subject to argument and speculation. There is no mention of it in the official Admiralty report on HX 84. Also, there is no mention of a fight being put up by the Beaverford in the numerous UK national and regional newspaper reports associated with HX 84 published during November and December 1940. Theodor Krancke makes no mention of a clash with the Beaverford in his book The Battleship Scheer, (co-authored by Hans Brennecke and published in 1956), and to this day the UK Ministry of Defence refuses to acknowledge the Beaverford incident.
During 2018, the Canadian naval heritage author and lecturer Roger Litwiller retold the story in The Sacrifice of SS Beaverford “The Heroic Saga of the Canadian Pacific Railway’s Ship with Teeth.”
However, British author Ian Collard in his book Canadian Pacific Ships (History Press 2022) mentions only that the Beaverford was sunk by the Admiral Scheer in the North Atlantic on 5 November 1940.
The story of the Beaverford appears to have first surfaced in 1944, in an article by Norman Mackintosh published in the magazine Canada’s Weekly. Mackintosh claimed Beaverford’s action against the Scheer was based on accounts from crew members of one of the other ships in the convoy.
For more than four hours she was afloat, followed by the raider, firing and fighting to the last. Using the big reserve of engine power and superb seamanship for steering and manoeuvring to baffle the enemy’s aim, for all that time she held her own, hit by shells but firing back and delaying the raider hour by hour while the rest of the convoy made their escape.
The story was picked up and published in the London Evening Standard.
Both she [Beaverford] and her nearest neighbour in the convoy had thrown out a smokescreen to shield the other ships in their vicinity. These ships then parted company – the CPR ship steaming south and the other going north.
From his bridge and with his aft guns firing the master of the northbound ship could watch the fighting almost to its end. For more than 5 hours the ‘Beaverford’ stayed afloat and fighting to the last, pursued by the raider.
The Beaverford story re-emerged during mid-1945 as a paragraph in the syndicated official story of the Canadian Pacific Fleet. Of the twenty CPR ships engaged in the war, twelve became casualties including the liner Empress of Britain, which at 42,348grt was the largest merchant ship to be sunk by the enemy. ‘Beaverford, was lost with all hands after a heroic five hours fight in the immortal Jervis Bay convoy of November 1940.’
Among the papers running the article were the Liverpool Evening Express (13 July 1945), the Bellshill Speaker (27 July 1945), the Midlothian Advertiser (27 July 1945), and the Jedburgh Gazette (3 August 1945).
Even then, it wasn’t the last word on the Beaverford. On Friday, 1 February 1946, the Stornoway Gazette & West Coast Advertiser, published a piece about Sub Lt Alexander Macdonald who had just arrived home in North Tolsta, Stornoway. On opening his mail, he found a letter from Ireland saying that a message placed in a bottle and thrown overboard by himself from the Beaverford in 1936 had been found on a beach.
Apart from the message in a bottle, the was once another link. During the 1930s the Marine Society attempted to foster relations between schools and merchant ships. Downhills Central School, Philip Lane, Tottenham, adopted the Beaverford. Sometime after HX 84, the school was presented with a brass plaque engraved:
SS BEAVERFORD.
OUR SHIP.
LOST WITH ALL HANDS
IN ACTION
5TH NOVEMBER 1940
After the school closed, the plaque eventually turned up in a local junkshop.
And what of the Stureholm? Having returned to Halifax with 65 survivors from the Jervis Bay, she was still loaded with 6850 tons of vitally needed steel and scrap. Arrangements were made for her to join convoy HX 91. However, apart from Captain Olander and five others, the entire crew refused to sail and paid off having had enough of the war. As Swedish neutrals they were entitled so to do and could not be forced to go back to sea. HX 91 sailed without her.
Olander, who was a sick man suffering from stomach ulcers, eventually managed to scrape a crew together. It included three rescued officers from the San Demetrio.
Stureholm eventually sailed with convoy HX 92. At 0156hrs on 12 December she was hit on the stern by a single torpedo fired by U-96. The U-boat commander Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock reported observing four lifeboats (in fact only two were carried) being launched prior to the ship sinking just eleven minutes after being hit. From the crew of 32 no survivors were ever found.
Interestingly, as with the Beaverford, the role played by the Stureholm was effectively ignored. Despite their undoubted bravery in rescuing survivors from the Jervis Bay, the ensuing ‘difficulties’ created by Stureholm’s crew resulted in the establishment closing ranks, dictating that a ‘NO AWARDS RECOMMENDED’ approach be adopted.
It wasn’t until 1959 that the part played by the Stureholm was semi-officially acknowledged. Even then it was a mere five-line paragraph in the programme for the annual bunfight of the Royal Naval Association.
For those of you who wish to read more there is a fascinating book published by Pen & Sword Maritime Convoy Will Scatter. The Full Story of Jervis Bay and Convoy HX84 by Bernard Edwards. ISBN 978 178159 376 2
Clive is our Transport and Railway writer, with years of experience he is a fount of knowledge on all things transport nostalgia.